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Feasibility, normative heuristics and the proper place of historical 
responsibility – a reply to Ohndorf et al. 
 
 
 
Abstract: In this comment, we pick up three points raised by Ohndorf et al. (2015) in their reply to 
our ethical assessment of the German Advisory Council’s Budget Approach (WBGUBA). First, we 
discuss and clarify the relationship between ethics and political feasibility, highlighting that the way 
Ohndorf et el. use feasibility creates an unwarranted status quo bias. Second, we explain the proper 
place historical responsibility should have within the WBGUBA, stressing the fact that the reasons 
why we choose one policy proposal over another matter. Third, we analyze the limited extent to 
which a normative heuristic should motivate an ethically ambitious policy proposal like the 
WBGUBA. 
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1. Introduction 
In their insightful reply, Ohndorf et al. (2015) make a range of critical observations, from the 
viewpoint of environmental economics, regarding the validity and applicability of our ethical 
assessment of the German Advisory Council’s Budget Approach (WBGUBA). In this paper, we 
examine some of Ohndorf et al.'s claims, focusing on the relationship between ethics and political 
feasibility, the proper place of historical responsibility, and the function of normative heuristics. Our 
aim is twofold: we want to clarify some of the issues discussed in our original paper so as to avoid 
misunderstandings, and we want to highlight how misconstruing the relationship between ethics and 
political feasibility leads to a problematic status quo bias. 
 
2. The relationship between ethics and political feasibility: avoiding a status quo 
bias 
The WBGUBA is a burden sharing approach, aiming to come up with a distribution of the burdens 
associated with timely and effective climate mitigation. Of course we agree with Ohndorf et al. 
(2015: 386) that some ways of distributing the burdens of climate mitigation might be ‘considered 
to be more just and/or politically feasible than others’. But Ohndorf et al. also claim that apart from 
any future climate agreement having to be ‘strict enough to considerably mitigate climate change’, 
the distribution of burdens must be ‘perceived as “fair” and, most importantly, acceptable to all 
players’ (2015: 387; emphasis added). While it is indeed true that any proposal will only be agreed 
upon if all parties can (on some level and for some reason) accept it, it is important to be clear about 
what the relationship between ethics and political feasibility is so as to avoid falling into an 
unwarranted status quo bias. With regard to the arguments presented by Ohndorf et al. we want to 
raise two main issues: first, the point at which ethics enters a political process (A); second, the way 
that political feasibility can be misused to narrow the political playing field and to thereby introduce 
a status quo bias (B). 
 
(A) First of all, in their response Ohndorf et al. (2015: 387-9) move from discussing the WBGUBA 
as a policy proposal to discussing agreements as outcomes of political bargaining This is a big shift 
since the WBGUBA explicitly aspires to being an ethically justifiable and politically acceptable 
policy proposal (see e.g. WBGU 2009: 2), while political bargaining processes often lack that kind 
of commitment. There is a distinct difference between a policy proposal (whose ethical credentials 
are fed into a political process) and the actual bargaining process as such (which might well be 
understood as a mere power game). Thus, while Ohndorf et al. (2015: 387) talk about actual 
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political agreements and hence situations of bargaining when stating that all that matters is that the 
outcome is ‘perceived as “fair” and, most importantly, acceptable to all players’ (emphasis added), 
these suggestions and observations have little traction when it comes to discussing the WBGUBA 
understood as a policy proposal which sees as one of its explicit strong points its ethical credentials 
in terms of actual rather than perceived fairness.  
Second, Ohndorf et al. (2015: 388) make the assumption that the distribution of the remaining 
carbon budget is ‘either a question of justice considerations, or a subject of political bargaining’. 
This, however, seems to get things wrong: political bargaining is a process that comes at the end 
and during this process a whole range of arguments will be considered, including ethical (which 
include justice-based considerations) and economic arguments. To suggest that bargaining can 
crowd out ethics and turn ethical considerations into an unnecessary luxury is to draw a skewed 
picture of what kind of process political bargaining is. Political bargaining processes rely on 
proposals and arguments having fed into the process at an earlier stage. In these proposals and 
arguments, ethical considerations should play an important role (even if it is unclear how strongly 
they resonate during the actual negotiation process). However, if the actual COP negotiations show 
one thing quite clearly, then that ethical considerations do in fact play such an important role in 
arguing for or against alternative proposals. Thus, to suggest that bargaining excludes ethical 
considerations would be misleading. 
 
(B) The main issue we tried to highlight in our original article (Schuppert and Seidel 2015), though, 
and which Ohndorf et al. seem to have somewhat misread is how the WBGUBA actually trades off 
ethical considerations for political feasibility, without a) making this trade off as explicit as 
necessary and b) realizing that political feasibility should be seen as a malleable variable, not a 
fixed parameter.  The way (the WBGUBA and) Ohndorf et al. approach political feasibility has two 
distinctive features: First, feasibility is essentially regarded as binary political acceptability (i.e. that 
people would vote for a proposal or that leaders would adopt a proposal) and acts as a threshold 
parameter, which proposals must pass in order to be worthy of discussion – either an option is 
(sufficiently) feasible and thus on the table, or it is not. Second, Ohndorf et al. seem to hold that no 
matter whether an option is feasible or not, its feasibility is somewhat fixed and not subject to 
(foreseeable) change. Both features are problematic: Of course, in one sense, ‘feasibility’ is a binary 
concept – if we understand it similar to ‘possibility’, then any proposal with a non-zero probability 
of being adopted is feasible.1 But this is not the sense in which Ohndorf et al. understand feasibility 
                                               
1 Note that from a strictly mathematical point of view, even events with zero probability might be possible (e.g. the 
probability that a real number randomly chosen from the interval [0,1] is precisely 0.436791 is exactly 0, although 
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constraints. For instance, they rule out the immediate stoppage of all GHG emissions from further 
consideration for the reason that this option is not politically acceptable (Ohndorf et al. 2015: 391), 
but arguably, it is not metaphysically impossible that even the most ambitious climate policy is 
adopted – it just is very unlikely, given voters’ and policy makers’ present preferences, motives and 
beliefs. So both WBGUBA and Ohndorf et al. use feasibility constraints to draw a strict line within 
the range of options with a non-zero probability of being adopted: some proposals, though possible 
(and thus feasible in the first sense) are ruled as too unrealistic or unlikely (and thus infeasible in 
another sense) – given voters’ and policy makers’ present attitudes. But as the intensifier “too” 
indicates, this account treats political feasibility, at the bottom, as a gradual rather than a binary 
concept: Within the set of possible options, some are more ‘realistic’ or more ‘feasible’ than others 
in the sense that politicians are more or less likely to be agree on them or voters are more or less 
likely to vote for them, and an option is too unlikely or unrealistic, if it falls below a certain 
threshold. By introducing this threshold, a new binary notion of feasibility has been generated, since 
the threshold separates the (newly) ‘feasible’ from the (newly) ‘infeasible’ options. And only on the 
basis of this (binary) threshold conception of feasibility is it possible to rule out certain possible but 
unlikely proposals on grounds of being ‘infeasible’. Now, we do not want to raise the issue of how 
difficult it is to justify the threshold. Our point is rather that where, exactly, the line is drawn 
depends on an contingent fact(more or less) controversial assumptions about voters’ and policy 
makers’ attitudes – what their given present preferences, motives and beliefs are – making the 
newly introduced threshold a socio-political choice, not an immutable fact. And these attitudes can 
and do change. More often than not, attitudes change for particular reasons, including ethical 
reasons. Therefore, using political feasibility as a binary concept to determine which options will be 
at all discussed in the public domain without attending to the fact that its binary structure is an 
artifact of introducing a threshold that is relative to given but changeable attitudes introduces an 
unwarranted status quo bias. 
In contrast to the WBGUBA’s and Ohndorf et al.’s terms approach of conceiving feasibility is 
nothing more than political acceptability, i.e. that people would vote for a proposal or that leaders 
are likely to adopt a proposal. For Ohndorf et al. feasibility is as a binary concept, something is 
either feasible (i.e. likely to be voted for) or not. However, political feasibility is of courseshould 
rather be understood as a gradual concept in the sense that any policy option that has a non-zero 
probability is somewhat feasible (which means that it is at all possible for this option to come 
about). It is within this realm of options with a non-zero probability that we commonly introduce a 
                                                                                                                                                            
this event is clearly possible – it can occur). So even proposals with zero probability of being adopted might be 
“feasible” in the sense of “possible”. 
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socio-politically constructed threshold which separates the options we deem feasible (or ‘realistic’) 
from those we hold to be infeasible (or ‘unrealistic’). However, the introduction of the threshold is a 
socio-political choice and by pretending that the threshold is fixed and immovable we naturalize an 
artificial political distinction. Policy makers faces a wide spectrum of options with some being more 
feasible than others, in the sense that it is more likely than not that people vote for the proposal in 
question or that a given leader will embrace said option. What is important here is that voters’ and 
leaders’ attitudes can and do change. More often than not, attitudes change for particular reasons, 
including ethical reasons. Therefore, to use political feasibility as a trump which already determines 
which options will be at all discussed in the public domain means to introduce an unwarranted 
status quo bias.  
While political feasibility of course matters and while it is in a case like climate change 
prudent to think about how one can square the circle of finding an ethically just and politically 
acceptable solution, subjugating the ethical to the feasible is unjustified and potentially dangerous. 
Imagine a slave holder society in which slaves are not only excluded from the political process but 
also treated very badly. In such a society any proposal for abolishing slavery might be considered 
utterly unfeasible. But is this really a good normative reason not even to table such proposals? We 
don’t think so. The ethical analysis of what is at stake needs to come first and only once we know 
what is right and what is wrong can we worry about the issue of how likely it is that the right option 
will be chosen if things were put to a vote. Moreover, to narrow the parameters of the political 
debate based on an immutable understanding of what is politically feasible does not only curtail 
political imagination, it also tips the scales towards preservation of the political status quo. This is 
precisely what seems to happen when the WBGUBA trades off the ethical aspect of historical 
responsibility (which based on the WBGU’s calculations would lead to immediate carbon 
bankruptcy for some states) for political feasibility, which suggests that historical over-emitters 
must be allowed to continue emitting (at reduced levels). In many cases, trade offs between ethical 
justifiability and political feasibility will be unavoidable. But to restrict one’s view in the name of 
political feasibility from the get-go is to deprive oneself of doing as well as one can, and to mask 
the fact that one engages in said trade offs is to hide from others valuable information about the 
normative losses one incurs by going for what is deemed feasible. 
 
3. The proper place of historical responsibility 
With regard to the proper place of historical responsibility Ohndorf et al. (2015: 389f.) respond to 
our initial argument that the WBGU allocates emission rights “with too little regard for both, past 
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injustices and overconsumption” (Schuppert and Seidel 2015: 401) by pointing out that the 
emission allocation which results from WBGU's equal per-capita approach (given constant 2008 
per-capita levels) “places a relatively heavy burden on industrialized countries and makes some of 
these countries “carbon-bankrupt” after only a few years, whereas ‘poorer’ countries with low 
historical emissions continue to dispose of spare budget in the year 2050” (2015: 390). This, 
Ohndorf et al. suggest, is in line with the polluter pays principle rather than showing ‘too little 
regard for past injustices and overconsumption’, as we have claimed.  
But this reply misunderstands our argument. We agree that to assess whether a distributive 
principle (such as WBGUBA) is in line with historical responsibility, we have look at the burdens 
induced by that principle and see how well burdens correspond to contributions to the problem (i.e. 
past emissions) – this is a necessary criterion of conformity with the polluter pays principle. But the 
burdens for agent P are a function of two variables: the initial emission permits allocated to P and 
P’s transformation rate (i.e. how a reduction in P’s emissions translates into additional burdens for 
P). AndIn addition, we argue that, from an ethical point of view, differences in contributions to the 
problem (i.e. differences in past emissions) ought to be reflected in the initial allocation of 
emissions rights as well (and not only in the burdens induced). Since allocating on an equal per-
capita basis disregards these differences, it is (to some extent) unjust – even if the transformation 
rates happen to be such that the resulting allocation of burdens corresponds to past emissions. So 
our claim about the proper place of past injustice (or historical responsibility) is “input-sensitive” in 
sense that the extent to which past injustice is reflected in the initial allocation of emission rights 
matters. By contrast, Ohndorf et al.’s claim is “input-insensitive” in sense that it is exclusively 
concerned with the relation between past missions and the burdens induced by the WBGUBA, 
(where these burdens are measured in terms of reach ofof the lifetime of the allocated budget, i.e. 
remaining time until carbon bankruptcy on an equal per-capita rule). On their account, historic 
responsibility is adequately taken into account if the burdens resulting from the initial allocation 
reflect differences in contributions to the problem, irrespective of whether these differences are also 
reflected in the initial allocation . Ohndorf et al. thus take the correspondence between burdens and 
past emissions as a sufficient criterion of conformity with the polluter pays principle.  
To illustrate the difference between input-sensitive and input-insensitive approaches, consider 
the following analogy: A twelve-piece-cake is to be shared among four kids, but two of them have 
secretly eaten up two thirds of it. What would be a fair allocation of the remaining four pieces 
among all four kids? The input-sensitive approach claims (i) that it is unfair to give each child one 
piece, because this disregards differences in the children’s contribution to the problem (the scarcity 
of the remaining cake and the associated harms of cake deprivation and frustrated expectations) at 
Formatted
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the level of the initial allocation, and (ii) that we ought to give the gluttons fewer of the remaining 
pieces. By contrast, on an input-insensitive approach exclusively concerned with the „reach of the 
cake budget“, an equal per-capita allocation is not necessarily unfair if the two gluttons have higher 
“cake consumption rates” and run “cake bankrupt” sooner than the other kids, because in this case 
the burdens induced – “cake deprivation” – would indeed reflect differences in the children’s 
contribution to the problem.  
To us, it seems evident that the input-sensitive approach is superior in the cake case. Here are 
two arguments why, from an ethical point of view, an input-sensitive approach to historical 
responsibility is also preferable in the case of climate change. First, the input-sensitive approach is 
required to avoid counter-intuitive ethical implications in certain cases. This is because the burdens 
induced by an allocation are a function of a factor which is not essentially linked to historical 
responsibility, viz. the present per-capita emission level: Other things (in particular: historical 
responsibility) being equal, higher present per-capita emissions imply shorter reach of the allocated 
budget. But although present per-capita emission levels are often tightly correlated with historical 
responsibility (in terms of past emissions), this is not necessarily so. As a consequence, the required 
correspondence between burdens induced and historic emissions does not hold if we compare 
emitters with high past, but low present per-capita levels, to emitters with low past, but high present 
per-capita levels. Consider the following set of examples with two equally populated countries, A 
and B (see table 1). Case I illustrates the burdens induced by WBGUBA under the assumption of 
Ohndorf et al.; everything seems fine, since the country with high responsibility (A) runs out of 
permits sooner than the country with low responsibility (B). But this is so only because in Case I, 
historical responsibility is highly correlated with current emissions. If, as in Case II, past high 
polluters are present low polluters, the correspondence between responsibility and burdens breaks 
down. 
 
CASE I historical responsibility 
initial 
permits 
current 
emissions/a 
reach of 
budget (a) 
country A high 50 25 2 
country B low 50 10 5 
CASE II     
country A high 50 10 5 
country B low 50 25 2 
CASE III     
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CASE I historical responsibility 
initial 
permits 
current 
emissions/a 
reach of 
budget (a) 
country A high 25 25 1 
country B low 75 10 7.5 
CASE IV     
country A high 25 10 2.5 
country B low 75 25 3 
Table 1 Set of examples with two equally populated countries. 
As Cases III and IV illustrate, this is not (or less likely) so, if historical responsibility is taken 
into account at the level of the initial allocation, such that high past emitters receive fewer initial 
permits: comparing induced burdens within the same current emissions scenarios (i.e. comparing 
Case I with Case III and Case II with Case IV), we see that the burdens induced correspond to 
historical responsibility (although to different degrees) in both input-sensitive approaches. So just as 
with the gluttonous kids, departing from an equal per-capita allocation is the more robust way to 
bring the burdens induced in line with historical responsibility.  
A second argument for the input-sensitive approach is this: It usually makes a moral 
difference whether we take a morally relevant factor explicitly into account when we distribute 
something or whether, accidentally, the distribution happens to coincide with what the morally 
relevant factor suggests. Suppose that because she cares for the two gluttons' health, the mother 
indeed gives fewer of the remaining four pieces to the two gluttons and more to the other two kids. 
Then although accidentally, she distributes in accordance with what correcting past injustice 
requires, she does the right thing for the wrong reason, since she does not take the past injustice into 
account in her deliberation. The two other kids could – rather precociously but rightly – complain 
that they have been wronged by having been deprived of their fair share (of three pieces), and that 
this wrong is not acknowledged unless their mother grounds her distribution upon this particular 
consideration. This suggests that ethically speaking, it is better to explicitly consider a morally 
relevant factor in the distribution than to accidentally end up with a distribution which happens to 
agree with what this factor implies (since the former but not the latter acknowledges the moral 
claims based on this factor). But in the context of historic responsibility for climate change, this 
idea speaks for an input-sensitive approach which adjusts the initial allocation for past emissions, 
since in Ohndorf et al.’s approach, historic responsibility is not explicitly considered at all while 
distributing (i.e. at the level of the initial allocation) – rather, the outcome (burdens induced) 
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happens to correspond to historic responsibility (as long as current per capita-emissions correlate 
with past emissions). And this is ethically not on a par with explicitly considering historic 
responsibility while distributing.  
These two arguments thus favor an input-sensitive approach: the proper place to account for 
historical responsibility is the initial allocation of emission rights, which implies departing from the 
equal per-capita rule. This is what we meant when we said: “WBGU seems to allocate equal 
emission rights for current people with too little regard for both, past injustices and 
overconsumption.” (emphasis added).  
 
4. The function of normative heuristics 
Now, one might be tempted to reply that by treating WBGUBA’s equal per-capita approach as a 
proposal for a just distribution of the remaining budget, we have misunderstood its intention. Rather 
than being the true answer to the question of distributive justice, it is merely an approximation to 
that answer – “a simple, easy to calculate shortcut”, “a normative heuristic” (Ohndorf et al. 2015: 
391).  
First note that this maneuver changes the WBGUBA’s justification – and thus its status – quite 
considerably. When the equal per-capita approach is understood as a normative heuristic, it is an 
easily calculated approximation to the distribution which would result, if we took into account the 
truly justice-determining features. This is a pragmatic, not an essentially ethical justification of 
basing climate policy on the equal per-capita allocation, and it amounts to a (partial) departure from 
the official policy addressed to policy-makers in WBGU (2009), where the rationale behind the per-
capita approach is presented as genuinely ethical: “From an ethical point of view, the best solution 
is to equally allocate emissions on a per-capita basis, so that national emissions budgets can be 
calculated according to the size of the population.” (WBGU 2009: 2).2  
Second, approximations are a matter of degree. But  when the stakes are as high as in climate 
change, we ought not to base policy advice on just any approximation. Rather, the approximation 
needs to be sufficiently good. So a normative heuristic is ethically acceptable only if it sufficiently 
well approximates the truly just distribution. But to assess whether the necessary condition is 
satisfied, we first have to come up with a reasonably sharp idea of how the truly just distribution 
looks like.3 This is the ethicists’ domain; so introducing normative heuristics does not dispense of 
the need to first engage in ethics properly. And if we have done so and have this reasonably sharp 
                                               
2 The departure is partial because later on (i.e. after the summary for policy-makers), the report is more cautious: 
“Based on the ethical principles outlined above, an allocation of equal per-capita emission allowances should be 
applied as a first approximation” (WBGU 2009: 22).  
3 Perhaps we do not necessarily have to give a full specification of the truly just distribution; cp. Sen 2009.  
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idea of how the truly just distribution looks like, why not use it as a distributive principle instead of 
the approximation? This poses a dilemma: Either we have no reasonably sharp idea of the truly just 
distribution; then Ohndorf et al. cannot claim that the suggested normative heuristic is a sufficiently 
good approximation, and the heuristic thus fails to be acceptable. Or we do have a reasonably sharp 
idea of the truly just distribution; then the heuristic is dispensable as an answer to the question of 
climate justice, and we should use that idea instead.4  
Third, even if the normative heuristic approximates the just distribution sufficiently well, this 
does not silence our second objection to the input-insensitive approach : Distributing emission 
shares on the basis of a sufficiently good normative heuristic rather than on the basis of the truly 
relevant considerations is distributing the right way for the wrong reason. Since this is morally 
defective, we should not be content to answer questions of distributive justice based on normative 
heuristics alone. Instead, we should do ethics properly, sharpen our idea of a just distribution by 
identifying the truly relevant considerations, and base the distribution of emission shares upon these 
considerations.  
 
                                               
4 A heuristic might still be useful for other reasons (e.g. due to its simplicity, it might avoid errors in application); but 
again, these are are reasons of a different (e.g. pragmatic) kind , and not reasons of justice. We like to thank 
Dominic Roser for pointing this out.  
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